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The objective of this paper is to discuss macroeconomic policies that would help African 
countries, especially the low income countries, reach strong, sustained and shared growth in the 
post-crisis world. The paper first reviews, with a special focus on LICs, macroeconomic policies 
in Africa prior to the crisis. It then discusses factors behind ‘the Africa surprise’ that is the 
continent’s overall good performance during the crisis and relatively fast recovery. It 
underscores that in the aftermath of the crisis, the emphasis of the macroeconomic policy needs 
to shift from the objective of very low inflation that predominated prior to the crisis towards 
growth. Fiscal policy is key in this regard, through public outlays on infrastructure anchored in 
the medium term expenditure frameworks that would also have a counter-cyclical role. Where 
conditions allow, frontier market LICs may want to consider adopting flexible inflation targeting 
frameworks that would provide sufficient room for expansion of credit to the private sector.  
  
JEL classification:  E5, F43, O11, O47 
 
Key words:  macroeconomic policies, growth, capital flows, Africa 
 
                                                            
1  The authors are especially thankful to John Weeks for helpful comments. They also thank John Anyanwu, Abdul 
Kamara, Gil Seong Kang, Louis Kouakou, Willi Leibfritz, Mthuli Ncube, Barfur Osei, Abebe Shimeles, Neema 
Siwingwa, and Desiré Vencatachellum for insightful suggestions. Wadji Sfafi provided excellent research 
assistance. Earlier versions were presented at the conference on ‘Impacts, Responses & Initial Lessons of the 
Financial Crisis for Low Income Countries’ (Copenhagen, October 2010) and at the seminar series at the African 
Development Bank. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the AfDB. 
E-mail addresses: z.brixiova@afdb.org; l.ndikumana@afdb.org; k.abderrahim@afdb.org.  
2 Kaouther Abderrahim is a consultant in the Development Research Department, African Development Bank. 
2 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, African policy makers have 
been rethinking their economic strategies for the next decade.3 Given the large share of low-
income countries (LICs) on the continent, poverty reduction still tops the policy agenda. At the 
same time, Africa’s high pre-crisis growth and a quick rebound from the crisis have highlighted 
the continent’s vast and so far mostly untapped economic potential. The key question then is how 
to turn Africa’s potential into substantial and tangible improvements in people’s living standards.  
With Africa rebounding, the consensus has emerged that the key policy challenge ahead 
of African policy makers is to turn the effective responses to the crisis and the ongoing recovery 
into strong, sustained and shared growth over the medium term. Such growth is key for building 
a prosperous Africa. While by itself it is not sufficient to reduce poverty, without the increased 
resources that growth will generate, progress with the other non-income poverty development 
goals will be also jeopardized. And only growth that is shared – through creating decent jobs and 
social safety nets – can be sustained through steady and wide popular support for reforms. 
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of macroeconomic policies prior to 
the crisis and responses to the crisis in Africa, with a focus on LICs, and discuss policy options 
in the aftermath of the crisis. The paper is organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section 
II takes a rearview mirror looking at Africa’s macroeconomic policies and performance during 
2001-08. Section III covers Africa’s overall surprising resilience during the crisis and discusses 
exit strategies from crisis interventions. Section IV outlines policies that would refocus the 
agenda from stabilization and very low inflation to strong, sustained and shared growth in the 
decade ahead. Section V concludes.   
II. Africa’s growth in the rearview mirror (2001-08) 
1. Growth and inflation outcomes 
At an average of 5.7 percent a year during 2001-08, Africa experienced its highest growth 
in decades. A combination of factors contributed to this strong performance. In addition to a 
favorable external environment, domestic factors such as reduced conflict, greater political 
stability, and prudent macroeconomic policies underpinned growth. A number of African LICs 
undertook structural reforms that improved the business environment (e.g., Rwanda, Ethiopia), 
the financial sector (Nigeria), administration, and governance (Sierra Leone). Moreover, 
increasing trade and investment flows between Africa and China, India and the Gulf countries 
are becoming an important driver of growth and a buffer against shocks. 
The high growth was wide-spread across the continent, with about 40 percent of countries 
having grown above average of 5 percent a year. Both middle-income countries (MICs) and low-
income countries (LICs) grew at almost the same rates during this period. Nevertheless, 
differences in rates persisted across subgroups such as the oil exporters and the oil importers as 
well as between fragile LICs, frontier market LICs, transition LICs and the rest (Figure 1 and 
                                                            
3 See Devarajan and Kasekende (2009). 
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Table AI.1 in Annex I). Oil exporters, frontier market LICs and transition LICs grew faster than 
the others, reflecting both the favorable external environment and domestic reform efforts.4 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth rates by Africa’s sub-groups (annual, percent) 1/ 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Economic Outlook database. 1/ EMEs denotes emerging market 
economies and FMs denotes frontier markets.  
Africa’s relatively high growth during 2001-08 was a positive turnaround, but it was still 
not high enough to initiate convergence to the living standards in advanced economies. Only 
about 25 percent of low-income countries (LICs) grew at 7 or more percent a year during this 
period. On the inflation side, about 40 percent of the LICs had inflation below 5 percent and 75 
percent of them below 10 percent during 2001 – 08 (Figures AI.1.a and AI.1.b, Annex I). The 
overall reduction in inflation is a marked improvement from the 1990s when less than half of 
LICs had inflation below 10 percent. Most countries, ranging from frontier markets to fragile 
states, were able to establish a lower and more stable inflationary environment (Figure AI.2., 
Annex I).5 However, the high growth needed to improve people’s lives has remained elusive for 
most African LICs. 
Yet, in most cases, very low inflation rates (below 5 percent) are not appropriate inflation 
targets for LICs. While benefits to growth of bringing down high inflation are well documented, 
empirical evidence shows that for LICs inflation hampers growth only if it exceeds a certain 
threshold (typically 10-20 percent); the positive impact of reduced inflation on growth is 
                                                            
4 This grouping of countries is based on income per capita, recent growth and medium-term growth prospects and 
the level of financial sector development. In that context, emerging market economies are for the most part middle 
income countries that have also accessed international capital markets and/or attracted the interest of foreign 
investors. Frontier markets exhibited substantial pre-crisis growth and resilience during the crisis, and also already 
have or are just about to access the international capital markets.  
 
5 Some countries recorded reductions in inflation rates from mid-double digits in the 1990s to low-single digits in 
the 2000s (e.g. Guinea Bissau) or further consolidated their stabilization gains by moving from high to low single 
digit inflation rates in 2000s (e.g., Cape Verde, Republic of Congo). 
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insignificant below this threshold. Moreover, LICs that target very low inflation (say below 5 
percent) can experience unintended contractionary effects in the event of shocks.6 At the same 
time, once inflation is stabilized at low level and expectations adjust, faster growth may be 
achieved without raising inflation. Put differently, LICs should not aim at very low inflation 
levels, with the threshold for ‘very low’ being often set at 5 percent or higher (IMF, 2005).  
In sum, at least some of the LICs that achieved very low inflation rates may have done so 
at some cost in terms of their growth. Going forward in the aftermath of the crisis, African LICs 
have an opportunity to rethink their macroeconomic strategies and focus on growth.7 
  
2. Constraints to growth   
Despite the strong performance observed prior to the crisis, African countries still face 
key constraints to medium and long-term growth that need to be addressed through appropriate 
policy interventions. Africa has been characterized by relatively low savings rates, especially in 
comparison to developing Asia (Figure 2a and Table AI.2, Annex). Once again, the aggregate 
numbers hide important differences across countries and groups such as North and sub-Saharan 
Africa.  While savings rates in North African countries increased rapidly during the pre-crisis 
commodity boom and as a result of financial sector development,8 they continued to be low in 
most SSA countries.  
From another perspective, low savings are oil importers’ Achilles heel. As many of the 
oil importing countries were unable to access international capital markets and did not attract 
much FDI, their investment rates were also low and relied on official aid. Long-standing factors 
such as low per capita income, low financial depth, high young-age dependency ratios, and aid 
dependency have contributed to low savings rates of this group, reinforced at times by conditions 
contributing to capital flight (e.g., weak investment climate).  
Increasing domestic savings rates and reducing capital outflows, especially the illicit 
ones, continue to be key policy challenges for this group.9 On the positive side, policy makers 
are able to impact public saving rates through measures geared towards resource mobilization 
and improved efficiency of government spending. On the other hand, private savings rates tend 
to be persistent, with changes in their determinants exhibiting full impact only after a number of 
years (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven, 2000).  
                                                            
6 Nigeria is a good example in this regard. With current (August 2010) inflation above 10 percent, the Central Bank 
aims at reducing it to 9.5 percent but not lower, stating that growth is the key priority. 
  
7 Collier (2007) pointed out that it was not clear to what extent the latest boom in the region was driven by improved 
commodity prices. However, some of the fastest growing countries (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania) are resource poor 
and introduced important structural reforms prior to the crisis, in addition to improved macroeconomic management. 
 
8 In these countries, saving and investment rates were below those in Asia. Some countries (e.g. Morocco) recorded 
asset booms prior to the crisis, with private investment going to non-tradable sectors. Overall, data on private 
savings rates is limited.   
 
9 Savings matters for growth and innovation, notably by allowing domestic and foreign investors to engage in joint 
ventures (Aghion, 2009). Elbadawi and Mwega (2000) cover the causes of low savings rates in SSA, while 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2010) discuss capital flight from SSA countries. 
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Oil exporters face different challenges. Despite higher savings rates (about 35 percent in 
2005-08), in the last few years prior to the crisis their investment rates were close, and private 
investment rates even below, those of oil importers (Figure 2́). This suggests that export proceeds 
were not used for enhancing productive capacity and competitiveness. Export proceeds and the 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves thus need to be better managed to maximize their 
development impact (Figure AI.3.a, Annex I).  
The conduct of monetary policy with fluctuating oil revenues also presents a challenge. 
Specifically, with rising revenues during the commodity boom, oil exporters’ deposit bases 
expanded and growth of credit to the private sector escalated. Subsequently, it declined markedly 
during the global financial crisis when commodity revenues plummeted, underscoring the 
importance of diversification (Figure A.3.b, Annex I).10  
Figure 2a. Africa and Developing Asia: National Savings and Investment Rates (% of GDP) 
 
Figure 2b. African Oil Exporters and Importers: Total and Private Investment Rates (% of GDP)  
 
Source: Arican Economic Outlook database and IMF WEO database.  
                                                            
10 As the global financial and economic crisis once again illustrated, undiversified, low value-added exports, lead to 
large volatility of proceeds, reiterating that greater diversification is needed both in terms of products and trade 
partners, including deepening South-South and regional trade and investment ties.   
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 African countries in general, and LICs in particular, also face a range of other structural 
constraints that undermine competitiveness, private sector development, and growth. Key among 
these are the infrastructure deficits that raise production and trade costs, rigid regulatory 
frameworks that discourage entrepreneurship, and weak market integration at national and sub-
regional level that limit the flow of goods and services while also limiting the gains from 
economies of scale. These constraints existed before the crisis and they will need to feature 
centrally in the national strategies aimed at unlocking the potential of the private sector and 
promoting diversification of the economic base as a means of laying the foundation for higher, 
sustained and share growth. 
Growth drivers 
Sources of aggregate demand 
Different factors drove aggregate demand across countries. Among the oil exporters, 
frontier markets and transition LICs, demand was driven largely by exports, while in the rest of 
the countries it was domestic demand-driven (Table 1). In the emerging markets, private 
consumption increased markedly during 2001—08, in some cases also in part due to the asset 
boom. The rising share of private investment in GDP in most subgroups (except oil exporters) is 
a positive development since it went mostly into productive capital and infrastructure, building a 
base for future growth.11  
Table 1. Changes in Domestic Demand in Africa, 2001- 08, percent of GDP 
  Consumption/GDP Investment/GDP 
  
Domestic 
Demand Total Private Public Total Private Public 
Africa 2.3 -0.5 -1.2 0.8 2.8 3.6 -0.8
        
Oil exporters -6.7 -3.4 -3.4 -0.1 -3.3 -4.8 1.5
Emerging markets 8.8 2.3 7.6 -5.3 6.5 5.4 1.1
LICs, frontier markets -3.2 -4.4 -4.6 0.2 1.1 3.4 -2.3
LICs, transition countries -0.8 -3.5 -8.4 4.8 2.7 7.9 -5.2
LICs, pre-transition 9.2 1.8 -1.2 3.0 7.4 8.3 -0.9
LICs, fragile 1/ 14.4 7.1 2.2 4.9 7.3 9.1 -1.8
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on African Economic Outlook database (un-weighted averages). 1/ If Liberia 
were excluded, demand for this group would be driven mostly by domestic consumption. .  
Rising private capital flows: magnitudes and impacts 
As many African countries are small open economies with low savings rates and/or 
volatile exports, capital flows – especially private capital flows recently – also fueled growth. 
While developed economies continue to account for the majority of the world FDI flows – they 
are the main source of outward FDI and receive about 70 per cent of the total inflows of FDI – 
and the long-term geographical pattern of the FDI flows has been gradually changing towards 
developing countries including in Africa.  
                                                            
11 This approach considers a short-term to medium-term horizon, where consumption (and aggregate demand) can 
stimulate output. Over the longer term, where both consumption and imports are functions of output (c = c(y) and z 
= z(y)), the relative shares of the drivers changes and exports are a key driver of growth.  
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In recent years, the net private capital flows to Africa (FDI) exceeded several times  
official flows. Specifically, after years of relatively slow growth, net private capital inflows to 
African countries accelerated in the early 2000s and surged between 2004 and 2007, reaching 
about $30 billion (slightly above 3 % of Africa’s GDP) in 2007, while official flows amounted to 
only $6 billion that year (Figure 3). The surge of private capital flows to Africa reflects both 
increased risk appetite of foreign investors searching for new profit opportunities, as well as the 
success of macroeconomic and structural reforms in many African countries.12  
The analysis of the components of private capital flows to North Africa and SSA prior to 
the crisis reveals that in both groups FDI accounted for the lion’s share of the total flows, with 
North Africa having received about 30 percent of total FDI going to the continent. However, FDI 
has been distributed unevenly even within Africa; the top five recipient countries received the 
bulk of FDI inflows to Africa during 2001 – 2008.  Resource rich countries and the mineral 
sectors attracted the main share of these flows, but more recently investors have discovered 
countries other than Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa, their traditional preferred destinations. 
Since mid-2000s, frontier market countries such as Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia have attracted 
increased FDI. As far as non-mining sectors, services – especially telecommunications and 
banking – have been receiving disproportionate shares of FDI (Figure A.4). 
 
Figure 3. Net private capital flows to Africa, 1981 – 2008 (in $ billions) 
 
Source: IMF WEO database.  
In addition to the FDI destinations, the sources of FDI have also changed during the past 
two decades, with the rising importance of Southern investors, especially from Asia. At the end 
of 2008, all top five ‘South’ investors in Africa were from Asia: China’s stock of FDI in Africa 
                                                            
12  Over the period, private capital flows to Africa and growth in advanced economies are negatively correlated, 
suggesting that the business cycles in advanced economies play a role in the availability of capital for the continent. 
Moreover, the share of Africa’s FDI in the FDI flows to emerging market and developing countries remains constant 
throughout the period, pointing to general increase of investors’ interest in developing countries.   
8 
 
amounted to over $13 billion, followed by Singapore ($9.8 billion), Malaysia ($3.7 billion), India 
($2.7 billion), and Korea ($0.5 billion) (UNCTAD, 2009). At about 5 percent of total FDI 
inflows, the share of African investment on the continent remained almost unchanged and well 
below that of intra-regional investment in other regions. Still, intra-African FDI flows constitute 
an important source of investment funds in several countries, especially in Southern Africa (e.g. 
Mauritius, Mozambique), with South Africa being the main investor (Figure A.4.c). 
 
While often beneficial, the impact of FDI on productivity and growth remains limited in 
most countries. For example, among several West African countries (Cape Verde, Ghana, 
Senegal, Nigeria) and Egypt during 1987 – 2008, FDI generated positive technological spillovers 
only in Cape Verde and Egypt. In Senegal and Ghana, the positive impact on FDI on growth 
occurred through capital accumulation and  increased the marginal product of capital, while in 
Nigeria, FDI did not seem to have any significant impact at the aggregate level, although some 
specific sectors may have benefited (Annex  II).  
 
The observation that FDI would be more beneficial for growth in more developed 
economies is consistent with the literature on the need to establish necessary threshold conditions 
for FDI to have a positive impact on growth. Specifically, empirical evidence suggests that some 
minimal threshold of development is needed for the host countries to benefit from FDI 
(Borenzstein et al., 1998; Alfaro et al., 2004; Wang and Wong, 2009). Put differently, if the 
institutional, technological and human capital gaps with the investor’s country are wide, the host 
country will lack capacity to absorb the technological and “know-how’ transfers. Efforts to raise 
human capital and technological capacity are therefore key to reaping development benefits from 
FDI.  
 
More broadly, the positive impact of FDI on growth and development of host countries is 
unlikely to materialize unless the other participants in this process, e.g. multinational enterprises, 
the sending countries and the international community, implement supporting policies. For 
example, given that trade and FDI reinforce each other and some FDI is even contingent on 
trade, further trade liberalization in sending countries would be FDI-enhancing. Equally 
important is that sending companies take into account technological priorities of recipient 
countries, and where feasible ‘clean’ technologies, to facilitate sustainable development. As 
OECD (2002) points out, MNEs have a key role to play by utilizing adequate technology, 
sharing knowledge, and adhering to good standards of corporate behavior. 
 
Capital flows and savings in Africa: complements or substitutes?  
  
While the link between capital flows (foreign savings) and domestic savings has been 
extensively examined for emerging market regions (e.g. Latin America, Asia, and emerging 
Europe), it has been relatively understudied for Africa and especially SSA, because of the lower 
private capital flows that the region has received in the past. With increased private inflows, the 
issue has gained in importance, especially in light of the implicit vulnerability to ‘sudden stops’. 
 
The short run responses of saving rates to capital flows in Africa during 1980-2008, 
measured by the pair-wise correlation between their cyclical components are presented in Table 
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2.13 The positive correlation points to complementarity between capital flows and savings; when 
it is negative, they are substitutes. Two observations stand out. First, the correlation between 
domestic saving and capital flows (foreign savings) is negative in SSA and positive in North 
Africa, suggesting that these are substitutes in the former and complements in the latter. Second, 
correlation between cyclical components of capital flows to North Africa and SSA was positive, 
suggesting that common external shocks determined capital inflows.  
Together, these observations point to different macroeconomic policy responses to capital 
flows in these sub-regions, with North Africa being able to raise investment rates substantially 
more than SSA during the 2000s, albeit still less than in developing Asia. However, this does not 
imply that SSA has only raised its consumption. Historically (from 1965 – 2006), only about 65 
percent of increased official capital flows relative to output in SSA was used for either 
consumption (41 percent) or investment (24 percent). The remaining portion of increased aid 
inflows financed outflows such as debt repayment, reserve accumulation and capital flight 
(Serieux, 2009). During 2000s, the outflows from SSA amounting to US$358 billion markedly 
exceeded that from North Africa of US$79 billion (Ker and Cartwright-Smith, 2010). The 
amount of illicit capital outflows from SSA and the acceleration of this trend during 2000s need 
to be addressed (see Ndikumana and Boyce, 2010).  
Table 2.  Africa: Co-movements of savings and net capital flows, 1980 – 2008 1/ 
  
HP filter 
correlation 
Band pass filter 
correlation 
Africa -0.141 -0.362* 
SSA -0.444* -0.59* 
North Africa 0.396* 0.307 
Low incomes countries 2/ -0.362 -0.496* 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database and the IMF WEO database. 1/ * 
Denotes significance at 10 percent level. 2/ Denoted countries eligible for concessional financing from the AfDB.   
3. Comparing pre-crisis macroeconomic paths of Africa and developing Asia 
In the ongoing development debate, Asia has often been an example of success that 
Africa could possibly follow, including in the areas of macroeconomic management and private 
sector development. Moreover, the low saving and investment rates, together with even more 
limited access to credit in the aftermath of the crisis, have raised questions whether African 
countries can reach high and sustainable long run growth.14 It is thus worthwhile to examine the 
key differences in the chosen macroeconomic and development paths during 2000s, with a view 
of identifying elements and policies that Africa could apply regardless of these differences.  
                                                            
13 The approach of Reinhart and Talvi (1998) is adopted. Annual data on savings rates and capital flows during 1980 
- 2008 are used and decomposed into their trend (permanent) and cyclical (temporary) components, using the HP 
and the band pass filters.  
  
14 According to the Solow growth model, technological progress is the only diver of the long-run growth, while 
investment plays a role only in transition. Since SSA economies are not in the steady state, investment rates matter. 
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Disparities in policies and outcomes among Africa’s subgroups notwithstanding, several 
observations can be made about the development paths undertaken by Africa and developing 
Asia. Asian economies in 2000s were characterized by high domestic (national) savings rates, 
active FDI policy, very low foreign debt, and –as a reaction to the Asian crisis – rapidly rising 
foreign exchange reserves. In contrast, due to limited domestic revenue mobilization, African 
economies exhibited lower savings rates and hence smaller room for domestic investment. This, 
in turn, led to greater dependency on foreign capital. Moreover, Asian economies have created a 
strong capacity to export manufacturing goods, which is almost absent in Africa where exports 
are dominated by primary commodities and low value-added products.15  
More broadly, on the spectrum of possible development paths, during 2000s Africa was 
notably closer than developing Asia to the “Washington Consensus”. This approach emphasized 
trade and FDI liberalization, deregulation and privatization, and reducing the role of the state in 
the economy. Much of this choice by African countries was driven by the financial arrangements 
with the IMF and the World Bank and especially by the debt relief initiatives. Still, in many 
ways, the reforms adopted during this period served Africa well, as the increased pre-crisis 
growth and the continent’s resilience during the global crisis illustrated. Regarding structural 
reforms such as improving governance and removing barriers to competition, Africa still lags 
behind other regions, underscoring the importance of further reforms.  
An open question also remains whether the objective of macroeconomic stability, in 
particular low inflation, was overemphasized among Africa’s economic policies at the expense 
of measures that stimulate growth and accelerate poverty reduction (as suggested above). More 
recently, policy makers all over the world recognized, and the impact of the global financial 
crisis reinforced, that the state has an important role to play in development, beyond creating an 
enabling environment for businesses and providing basic social services. The departure of the 
prevailing development paradigm from excessive emphasis on the market was in part due to the 
positive role of state interventions in growth promotion in Asia. 
 
In sum, even though during the run up to the crisis Africa reached its highest growth rates 
in decades, the rates were still below those recorded by developing Asia. Africa’s growth was 
not only lower, but also more volatile than that of Asia. Moreover, where high growth was 
achieved, it often brought about widening inequalities, as many African countries are still 
missing indigenous industries, in particular manufacturing, or highly productive services. 
Correspondingly, political room to pursue social policies, including building adequate social 
safety nets, was also limited. Key factors behind these different development paths have been (i) 
notably lower saving rates in Africa than in Asia, especially among its oil importers; and (ii) 
volatile and low-value added exports of oil exporters. These factors contributed to Africa’s 
dependence on external environment including official aid and exports markets, and made the 
continent vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
                                                            
15 Regarding similarities, African oil and commodity exporters also accumulated high reserves (albeit lower than in 
Asia) during the commodity boom, underscoring the importance of appropriate management of reserves.  
 
11 
 
III. Impact of the crisis on Africa and the exit strategies16 
  
a. The Africa surprise 
 
Overall impact of the crisis 
In 2009, Africa’s high growth was interrupted by a severe external shock in the form of 
the global financial and economic crisis. Most African countries were hit hard through the real 
channels such as declining exports and FDI and in some cases also aid, remittances and tourism 
receipts. Subsequently, in 2009 most key macroeconomic indicators deteriorated. Real GDP 
grew on average by only 2.5 percent, but the performance varied from 6.8 percent decline 
(Seychelles) to 9.9 percent growth (Ethiopia). The impact on SSA was severe, as growth 
collapsed from an average of 6.1 percent during 2001-08 to 1.6 percent in 2009. Since the crisis 
was an external shock, the countries that were more open to trade and grew faster before the 
crisis experienced larger growth falls in 2009. Correspondingly, they are expected to recover the 
fastest, alongside the multispeed global revival (Figure A.I.5, Annex I). Nevertheless, as the 
global recovery remains fragile, there are downside risks to Africa’s outlook. 
Regarding other key macroeconomic indicators, the curtailed demand in the advanced 
economies and lower commodity prices led to a marked deterioration of trade and current 
account balances; oil exporters took a particularly heavy hit. A number of countries experienced 
‘twin deficits’, as worsening current account balances were accompanied by rising fiscal deficits; 
no marked reversal occurred in 2010 except for oil exporters. In low income countries in general 
and (resource poor) fragile states in particular, the deterioration of the current account balances 
to high levels raises concerns about maintaining hard-won debt sustainability over the medium 
term (Table A.I.1, Annex I).  Unemployment and working poverty have also escalated due to the 
crisis.  ILO (2010) estimated that the working poverty (people living on less than 1.25 dollar a 
day) may have increased up to 15 percent in 2009  due to the crisis, which would bring the rates 
back to 2003 levels. Unemployment in Africa is also estimated to have increased markedly, by 
about 1 – 4 million people between 2008 and 2009.17  
Focus on private capital flows 
Given the importance of private capital flows in ‘financing’ Africa’s economies, we 
discuss in some detail their developments during the global financial and economies crisis. On 
the eve of the global financial crisis, most of African economies had only limited links with the 
global financial system. Nevertheless, the substantial inflows in 2000s made some emerging and 
                                                            
16  Parts of this section draw on African Development Bank, UNECA, AUC (2010), ‘Africa’s Voice on 
Development’, presented at the 2010 KOAFEC Conference (Seoul, September).  
 
17 Specific examples include the mining sector in Zambia where 28 percent of jobs were lost already in 2008, while 
the manufacturing sector in South Africa shrank by about 20 percent in 2009.  
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frontier market economies more integrated into the global financial markets, and more 
vulnerable to the risks of “sudden stops” and reversals of capital flows.18   
? South Africa experienced “sudden stops” in 2008, when its external equity and bond 
issuance declined from about $20 billion in 2007 to less than $4 billion. Its stock market 
index plummeted in the last quarter of 2008 due to the net outflows and large equity price 
corrections, but has been gradually recovering since the second quarter of 2009. 
?  
? In contrast, capital flight from Nigeria led to a plummeting stock market index by 70 
percent between February 2008 and March 2009; the market is yet to recover from these 
shocks. These developments amplified the difficulties of the banking sector, which 
stemmed mostly from poor governance and excessive lending to the energy sector.19 
On balance though, due to low financial depth and under-developed financial systems in 
the low income and fragile countries which account for the bulk of Africa, the continent’s overall 
financial integration is limited. Moreover, since most of the private capital flows to Africa took 
the form of FDI, the continent’s exposure to the global credit crunch was less severe.20  Africa 
was thus mostly shielded from the direct impact through the financial channel when the crisis hit. 
Moreover, in a number of cases the vulnerability to external financial shocks has been reduced 
due to reforms that strengthened the financial sector and macro-prudential indicators, and debt 
relief received prior to the crisis.21 The policy space to absorb the massive external shock created 
by the crisis has thus been larger than prior to the previous crises.  
 
SSA in particular has been more immune to the impact of the financial crisis than other 
developing and emerging market regions (Figure 4).22 While FDI flows to Africa continue to be 
small in absolute amounts, when measured in terms of GDP, in 2009 SSA received more net FDI 
inflows than emerging and developing countries on average. However, when it comes to official 
capital inflows to mitigate the crisis, SSA has received smaller amounts (even relative to GDP) 
than other developing regions except Asia, which has led the global recovery.23 The limited 
                                                            
18  In fact, according to investment-based indicators their degree of financial integration was close to that of 
emerging market countries in other regions, such as Latin America, albeit below that of the emerging Europe. 
 
19 In August 2009 the Central Bank of Nigeria injected funds equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP into the banking 
system to raise the capital adequacy of the banks to the regulatory minimum level, when five leading Nigerian banks 
posted losses from non-performing loans. The management of the banks was replaced.  
 
20 Tong and Wei (2009) showed that the degree of credit crunch experienced by the emerging market and developing 
countries depended in part on the composition of their capital flows. Specifically, countries that were more exposed 
to the non-FDI private flows prior to the crisis also faced more severe credit crunch. For African low-income 
countries, the global credit crunch took mostly the form of limited trade financing.  
 
21 The banking sectors in Africa remain relatively profitable, partly due to restrictions on competition.  
 
22 For example, in 2008 SSA’s non-FDI private financial inflows declined by only about 1 percentage point of GDP 
from the average of 2003-07, while those to the CIS declined by more than 9 percentage points on average.  
 
23  The regions hit the most severely by the crisis in 2009 – the emerging Europe and the CIS – also benefited the 
most from the assistance from the international community. 
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availability of the official aid has also underscored the importance for African countries to attract 
adequate private capital flows to fuel growth, while managing their volatility.   
 
Counter-cyclical policies 
 Due to the prudent macroeconomic stance and the debt relief prior to the crisis, a number 
of countries have built up sufficient policy space to adopt counter-cyclical measures when the 
crisis hit. Fiscal policies played a key role, for the most part through increased government 
expenditures on infrastructure (e.g., Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania). This policy choice is consistent 
with the need not only to stimulate short run aggregate demand through higher outlays, but also 
to release supply side bottlenecks over the medium term, thus laying the foundations for high 
growth.24 While countries also adopted an accommodative monetary stance, given the structural 
rigidities and limited links between interest rates and credit, monetary policy was much less 
effective in stimulating growth except in a few middle income countries (e.g., South Africa). 
Even frontier markets in East Africa had to rely more on fiscal policy to counter the crisis, with 
monetary policy being less effective (Figure A.I. 6). 
Figure 4. Capital flows before and during the crisis, 2003-07, 2008 and 2009 1/ 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IMF WEO database. 1/CEE denotes Central and Easter Europe and CIS 
stands for the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
 
The crisis has thus also shown that in Africa cuts in policy rates do not necessarily 
increase credit to the private sector, pointing to structural rigidities and inefficiencies in financial 
systems. With these impediments, the private sector alone will not be able to drive Africa’s near-
term recovery; continued effective state interventions will be needed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
24 In Kenya, the government financed infrastructure by issuing local-currency infrastructure bonds. Kasekende, 
Brixiova and Ndikumana (2010) discuss the counter-cyclical policies of African countries during the crisis in detail.   
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Africa’s near term prospects  
On balance though, Africa has shown a surprising resilience during this crisis and is now 
staging a robust comeback.  The continent as a whole avoided recession, and output in only 10 
out of 53 countries contracted in 2009. The growth is expected to reach 4.5 percent in 2010 and 
5.2 in 2011. Except for Madagascar, all African countries are projected to record positive growth 
in 2010 and in 2011. Many, including some fragile states, are recovering fast as commodity 
prices rebound. According to the African Development Bank’s projections, in 2011 Africa will 
be again one of the fastest growing world regions (Figure 5). At the same time, the multispeed 
global recovery still poses downside risks to Africa’s outlook, while the potential growth could 
be permanently hampered by the crisis (Brixiova, Kamara and Ndikumana, 2010a).  
Figure 5. Africa and other regions, real GDP growth (2006 – 2011, forecasted), percent 
 
Sources: African Development Bank database and IMF WEO (October 2010).  
Nevertheless, the impact was varied. In some countries (e.g., Swaziland, Cape Verde) the 
crisis has reduced the fiscal policy space by raising the deficit and financing it through debt. In 
others (e.g., Ghana, DRC) inflation accelerated, cutting the room for policies to stimulate 
aggregate demand. Finally, in spite of overall sound levels, in some countries (e.g., Chad, 
Malawi) international reserves declined markedly. For example, Chad’s reserves collapsed by 
almost 50 percent between 2008 and 2009, from 3.8 months of imports to about 2 months. 
Similarly, Malawi’s international reserves declined by 35 percent and stood at mere 2 weeks of 
imports in 2009 (down from 1 month in 2008).  
Overall, Africa has weathered the crisis overall well due in part to: (i) cautious 
macroeconomic policies adopted across many countries prior to the crisis; (ii) appropriate 
counter-cyclical measures adopted where feasible; (iii) increased trade and investment linkages 
with Asia (e.g. Angola, Namibia, Gabon, Benin) and other emerging market countries; and (iv) 
in some sub-regions, more intensive regional integration and good diversification also helped. 
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Exit strategies from crisis interventions 
 
Despite the positive outlook, uncertainties stemming from a fragile global outlook 
surround also Africa’s recovery. Given that in 2010 (and even 2011) many countries are 
projected to grow below their trend growth, the key policy challenge is to bring them on a path 
of strong, sustained and shared growth, including through demand management policies as a 
response to the crisis. In 2010, this suggestion is in line with the adopted policies -- about 40 
percent of countries are projected to have higher fiscal deficit in 2010 than in 2009 (AfDB and 
OECD, 2010). African governments may want to maintain somewhat accommodative policies 
also in 2011, while gradually refocusing on medium term objectives and fiscal consolidation.  
Exit strategies from the crisis intervention policies should thus be gradual and well coordinated 
across countries and policies.25  
Given the case for gradual exits from accommodative policies, the key question is then 
how much policy space, especially on the fiscal and inflation sides, African countries have to 
pursue accommodative stances in 2011. Despite a deterioration in a number of countries (Figure 
A.I.7, Annex I), most African countries have emerged from the crisis with stronger fiscal 
positions than the advanced economies. The countries hit particularly hard in 2009 were oil or 
mineral exporters which are expected to rebound quickly. A few exceptions aside, debt 
sustainability has not been so far a major concern, even though the problem may arise over the 
medium term unless the current stance is reversed. Often, the countries underperforming on 
growth (i.e. growing below their trend growth rates) are over-performing on inflation (i.e. with 
inflation rates either below 5 percent or within 5 -10 percent, but below their trends) (Figure 6). 
In these cases, countries should not avoid stimulating aggregate demand out of  fear of raising 
slightly inflation; bringing their economies on a high growth path is a much more urgent priority. 
In sum, growth should be the key macro priority in the near term for most African 
countries, especially LICs. For those with ‘room to inflate’, inflation is not a priority right now 
as moderate increase can be reversed later, once high growth is restored. Still, with deteriorating 
fiscal and current account deficits, fiscal policy needs to ensure that any ‘extra’ public 
expenditures are growth oriented; increasing infrastructure spending can be particularly useful 
for removing supply-side bottlenecks. At the same time, African policy makers need to ensure 
that important social outlays remain protected or even scaled up. Building social safety nets is 
also important so that in the future the most vulnerable segments of the population are protected 
and growth is shared. A positive effect of such measures would be also the creation of automatic 
fiscal stabilizers on the expenditure side, now missing in most African countries. 
IV. Beyond the crisis: pro-growth macroeconomic policies 
With Africa rebounding, the objectives of macroeconomic policy need to gradually shift 
from short-run stabilization policies geared at recovery to stimulating medium-term growth with 
job creation.26 Going forward, rather than overemphasizing price stability, macroeconomic 
                                                            
25 Brixiova, Kamara, and Ndikumana (2010b) discuss the exit options for African countries in greater detail.  
 
26 In particular, going forward policy priorities should not overemphasize very low inflation at the cost of growth, as 
was typically the case before the crisis, particularly in low-income countries. 
 
16 
 
policy should aim at supporting strong, sustained and shared growth as a way to build prosperity 
and reduce poverty in Africa’s LICs.  
As the crisis demonstrated, countries that had more flexible macroeconomic frameworks 
and built up cushions, especially through fiscal policy space, fared better. The main lesson from 
the crisis is that macroeconomic frameworks need to be more flexible while maintaining their 
credibility. On the fiscal side, LICs would benefit from replacing pro-cyclical policies of the past 
(Annex III) with rule-based and counter-cyclical frameworks that still leave room for discretion 
to counter unexpected shocks. In practical terms this means building automatic stabilizers on the 
expenditure side (e.g., social safety nets), while strengthening medium-term expenditure 
frameworks.  
Figure 6. Africa: room to grow and room to inflate, 2010 1/ 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database. 1/ Growth gap is the difference between the potential 
growth (average of 2006 – 2008) and the actual growth in 2010. Inflation gap is calculated as the difference between 
the targeted/trend inflation (average of 2001-2008) and the actual inflation in 2010. In cases where inflation trend 
was below 5 percent, target was set as 5. Similarly, where inflation trend was above 10 percent, target was set at 10. 
Positive growth gaps mean that countries should aim at higher growth; positive inflation gap means that there may 
be some room to inflate, especially for low income countries with inflation below 5 percent.  
In pro-growth oriented macroeconomic policy, phasing out pro-cyclical fiscal policies 
that prevailed in the run up to the crisis would in particular help achieve sustained growth by 
reducing output volatility.27 The objective of fiscal policy should thus be balancing budgets (net 
domestic financing) over the cycle. Given the need to raise efficiency of public spending and 
                                                            
27 Evidence of procyclical patterns of fiscal policies is in Annex III.  
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maintain debt sustainability, annual budgets should be anchored in medium-term expenditure 
frameworks. Such frameworks can also play a counter-cyclical role. Donors could support such 
frameworks by giving adequate official aid in a timely and predictable manner. Moreover, to 
avoid pro-cyclical fiscal cuts in downturns, African governments need to develop domestic debt 
markets and improve their access to debt financing, as the example of Kenya showed. For 
frontier market LICs, gaining access to international bond markets on more competitive terms is 
also important.  
To reach strong, sustained and shared growth, public expenditures (and official aid) need 
to scale up public investments, whose share in budgets has been declining, in exchange for 
increasing social outlays.  Given the limited domestic resources in a number of Africa’s LICs 
(especially oil importers), the increased deficits will need to rely on either official aid or external 
private financing (e.g., Ghana) or local-currency infrastructure bonds (e.g., Kenya). Moreover, it 
will be important that African policy makers use the external sources in such a way that they 
stimulate domestic resource mobilization. While high tax levies surely discourage private 
investment and entrepreneurship, dynamic benefits of public expenditures for growth and 
development need to be taken into account and an optimal balance found (UNCTAD, 2010).  
As the pre-crisis and crisis experience illustrated, monetary policy is not a particularly 
effective tool of macroeconomic management in Africa’s LICs. As the globalized economy 
requires quick responses to shocks, there has been a world-wide trend towards more flexibility in 
monetary and exchange rate regimes, which is likely to continue and should be supported.28 
Where conditions allow (in some frontier market LICs), consideration could thus be given to 
introducing flexible inflation targeting (IT) frameworks, as was done in South Africa and Ghana.  
Recent global developments also showed once again the negative effects that freezing up 
of credit can have on growth. As the view that in developing countries monetary policy affects 
output mostly through the credit channel has gained acceptance, African central bankers have 
increasingly focused on credit as the key part of the monetary transmission mechanism. Hence 
going forward, a key task of monetary policy in Africa’s LICs would be to ensure that sufficient 
private sector credit is available to fuel private investment and growth.29 At the same time, the 
role of public investment (especially in infrastructure) as a driver of growth is key, both through 
releasing supply side bottlenecks and through ‘crowding in’ private investment.  
V. Conclusions 
This paper reviewed macroeconomic policies in Africa prior to the crisis, with a special 
focus on LICs. It pointed out that while many countries, including many LICs, achieved very low 
inflation (below 5 percent a year) and higher growth than in the past, their growth was still not 
high enough to meaningfully reduce poverty and begin bridging the gap in living standards with 
                                                            
28 In 1970s, 90 percent of all countries had fixed exchange rate regimes; in 2000 less than 30 percent of countries.  
In Africa, the share of countries with flexible regimes has also increased over time. According to the IMF 
classification, 44 countries out of 192 practiced formal inflation targeting as of April 31, 2008, up from 19 countries 
(among 187) that had this regime in 2003. Some countries target inflation informally. 
29 Such monetary policy needs to be accompanied by structural reforms to remove obstacles to obtaining credit, to 
be effective. Many other policies, including industrial policy to stimulate the private sector, policies geared towards 
regional integration and product diversification as well as building of social safety nets, are key for strong and 
shared growth. They are outside of the scope of this paper and are covered elsewhere (AfDB, UNECA, AUC, 2010).   
18 
 
advanced economies. At the same time, the cushions built up prior to the crisis as well as 
increased trade and investment relations with emerging markets helped Africa weather the 
external shock and stage a relatively fast recovery.  
 
The paper underscores that in the aftermath of the crisis, the emphasis of macroeconomic 
policy needs to shift from the objective of stabilization and achieving low inflation that 
predominated prior to the crisis towards supporting strong, sustained and shared growth. To 
reach this goal, countries would benefit from macroeconomic frameworks (i.e. fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate regimes) that are more flexible, while maintaining credibility. Fiscal policy is 
key in this regard, through public outlays on infrastructure anchored in the medium term 
expenditure frameworks that also have a counter-cyclical role. Where conditions allow, frontier 
market LICs may want to consider adopting flexible inflation targeting frameworks that provide 
sufficient room for providing credit to the private sector. To be effective, efforts in the area of 
macroeconomic policy would need to be accompanied by structural reforms to address supply 
side bottlenecks. To achieve shared growth, African policymaker will need to put even greater 
emphasis on creation of highly productive jobs and building up of formal social safety nets, 
which are still vastly missing in Africa.   
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ANNEX I – TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table AI.1a. Selected Macroeconomic Indicators Prior, During and After the Last 2 Crises 1/ 
1986-90 1991 1992 1993 2004-08 2009 2010 2011
(% of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
Real GDP growth (%) 1.5 0.8 0.0 ‐2.8 6.9 2.4 4.9 4.9
Inflation (%) 9.6 19.1 19.3 18.8 6.8 10.3 7.7 6.4
Current account balance ‐6.0 ‐4.9 ‐5.5 ‐5.5 6.1 ‐4.1 1.9 2.9
Fiscal balance ‐6.0 ‐2.4 ‐3.0 ‐5.2 3.6 ‐0.5 2.3 2.1
Real GDP growth (%) 5.9 4.2 3.6 2.7 4.9 0.1 3.6 4.1
Inflation (%) 9.1 8.9 7.7 9.1 5.9 7.7 4.5 4.5
Current account balance 0.5 0.5 ‐1.2 ‐2.3 ‐2.9 ‐7.1 ‐8.1 ‐8.2
Fiscal balance ‐3.2 ‐2.6 ‐5.5 ‐6.8 ‐1.9 ‐5.7 ‐4.6 ‐4.9
Real GDP growth (%) 4.9 0.3 ‐0.3 4.2 6.3 4.7 5.5 6.1
Inflation (%) 49.5 31.5 46.4 46.7 9.7 9.6 8.3 6.7
Current account balance ‐5.8 ‐5.8 ‐5.8 ‐7.3 ‐6.9 ‐10.4 ‐10.6 ‐9.4
Fiscal balance ‐5.7 ‐3.9 ‐4.2 ‐4.6 0.9 ‐3.5 ‐4.1 ‐3.8
Real GDP growth (%) 2.6 1.0 ‐0.6 2.5 6.4 4.9 5.2 6.0
Inflation (%) 10.3 16.3 13.8 12.5 10.2 11.7 6.4 6.2
Current account balance ‐8.2 ‐12.8 ‐12.4 ‐11.3 ‐10.0 ‐10.1 ‐8.6 ‐8.8
Fiscal balance ‐7.0 ‐7.0 ‐7.7 ‐5.8 ‐0.6 ‐0.1 ‐1.6 ‐3.4
Real GDP growth (%) 2.8 1.8 0.6 1.4 4.7 1.1 3.3 4.7
Inflation (%) 6.1 4.1 4.7 3.3 6.0 4.0 4.3 4.1
Current account balance ‐4.4 ‐3.1 ‐3.5 ‐4.4 ‐12.4 ‐12.8 ‐14.5 ‐16.1
Fiscal balance ‐10.8 ‐13.7 ‐14.3 ‐12.3 5.6 3.1 ‐2.0 ‐2.3
Real GDP growth (%) ‐0.2 ‐2.1 ‐5.3 ‐4.1 3.9 2.6 4.1 4.8
Inflation (%) 29.4 28.0 23.4 13.3 9.8 5.5 5.5 4.7
Current account balance ‐11.7 ‐8.8 ‐14.2 ‐8.7 ‐9.7 ‐14.9 ‐16.3 ‐15.7
Fiscal balance ‐5.6 ‐14.6 ‐7.6 ‐6.3 2.0 ‐0.6 ‐2.6 ‐3.2
Low Income Countries, Fragile states
Low Income Countries, Pre-transition
Oil Exporting Countries
Emerging Market Countries
Low Income Countries, Frontier markets
Low Income Countries, Transition
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database. 1/ Un-weighted averages. The 
country grouping is defined in Table AI.1b. 
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 Table A.I.1b. Country classification30  
 
Oil Exporters  
LICs, Frontier 
Markets  LICs, Transition 
Angola  Ghana  Burkina Faso 
Cote d'Ivoire  Kenya  Djibouti 
Cameroon  Mozambique  Ethiopia 
Congo, Rep.  Senegal  Lesotho 
Algeria  Tanzania  Malawi 
Egypt  Uganda  Rwanda 
Gabon  Zambia  
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Equatorial Guinea     
Libya  LICs Fragile States  LICs, Pre-transition 
Nigeria  Burundi  Benin 
Sudan  
Central African 
Republic  Gambia 
Chad  Comoros  Madagascar 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Guinea  Mali 
  Guinea Bissau  Mauritania 
Emerging 
Markets  Liberia  Niger 
Botswana  Sierra Leone  Togo 
Cape Verde     
Mauritius     
Morocco     
Namibia     
Seychelles     
South Africa     
Swaziland     
Tunisia     
                                                            
30 Besides oil resources, the main distinguishing criteria for this grouping are (i) income level (GDP per capita); 
growth trends and prospects (e.g. private sector development) and (ii) the level of development of financial markets, 
including access to international capital markets.   
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Table AI.2. Africa and developing Asia: Savings, Investment and Net Capital Flows, 1991 – 
200831  
   1991 - 95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-08 2006 2007 2008 
 % of GDP 
Investment         
     Africa 19.4 19.4 21.8 23.6 21.8 23.9 25.1 
       North Africa 23.4 21.1 26.5 27.6 25.2 28.0 29.4 
       Sub-Saharan Africa 17.3 18.3 19.0 21.5 20.2 21.7 22.7 
    Developing Asia 33.9 31.6 33.6 37.9 37.9 37.8 38.1 
        
  Saving rates 1/        
     Africa 18.0 18.8 22.8 28.2 28.1 27.6 28.9 
       North Africa 24.2 23.4 33.5 40.4 40.6 40.5 40.0 
       Sub-Saharan Africa 14.6 15.8 16.7 21.8 21.8 20.9 22.7 
     Developing Asia 31.9 32.5 36.2 44.2 44.0 44.9 43.8 
        
  CAB/GDP 2/        
     Africa -1.5 -0.6 1.1 4.6 6.3 3.8 3.8 
       North Africa 0.8 2.3 7.0 12.8 15.4 12.4 10.6 
       Sub-Saharan Africa -2.7 -2.6 -2.3 0.3 1.7 -0.8 -0.1 
     Developing Asia -2.0 1.0 2.7 6.3 6.1 7.1 5.7 
        
  ∆R (reserves) 3/        
     Africa -0.7 -0.6 -2.6 -4.2 -5.0 -4.2 -3.4 
       North Africa -1.4 -1.0 -4.8 -8.5 -8.9 -9.0 -7.7 
       Sub-Saharan Africa -0.4 -0.4 -1.2 -2.0 -2.9 -1.8 -1.2 
     Developing Asia -1.9 -1.2 -5.1 -7.8 -6.8 -10.7 -6.0 
        
  Net capital flows – total         
     Africa 2.2 1.2 1.5 1.4 -1.3 0.4 -0.4 
       North Africa 0.6 -1.3 -2.2 -4.3 -6.5 -3.5 -3.0 
       Sub-Saharan Africa 3.1 2.9 3.6 1.7 1.3 2.6 1.2 
     Developing Asia 4.0 0.3 2.4 1.5 0.7 3.6 0.3 
        
Memorandum items        
        
Private capital flows        
       North Africa 1.3 1.1 1.1 2.4 1.1 2.5 3.6 
       Sub-Saharan Africa 1.0 2.0 1.9 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database, the IMF WEO database for Asia, 
and authors’ calculations. 1/ National savings rates. 2/ Includes errors and omissions. 3/ Increase in foreign reserves 
is recorded as negative .R∆  
                                                            
31 Developing Asia is defined as in the IMF’s 2010 World Economic Outlook.   
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Figure AI.1.a. Inflation and growth in Africa’s LICs, 1990-1999 
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Figure AI.1.b. Inflation and growth in Africa’s LICs, 2000 - 2008 
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Source: African Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations.  
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Figure AI.2.a. Africa’s frontier markets: average and standard deviation of inflation 
 
 
Figure AI.2.b. Africa’s transition countries and fragile states: average and standard deviation of 
inflation 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on African Development Bank database.  
24 
 
Figure AI.3.a. Foreign Exchange Reserves (stocks), 1991 – 2009 (% of GDP) 
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Source:  African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations.  
 
Figure AI.3b. Growth of Real Credit to the Private Sector in SSA, 2003 – 2009 (%)  
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Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook for sub-Saharan Africa (April 2010) and authors’ calculations.   
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Figure AI.4.a: South Africa:  FDI Inward stock in 2006, by sector (% of total) 
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Source: Investment map, UNCTAD & ITC 2010. 
Figure AI.4.b. Africa: FDI Inflows to Oil Exporters and Importers, 1990-2008 (million of US$) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD (2009a).  
Figure AI.4.c. South Africa’s Outward FDI in the Rest of Africa, 2001 – 2008, Millions of Rand 1/ 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Reserve Bank of South Africa data. 1/ Stock as of December 31.  
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Figure AI.5.a. Fastest growing countries in 2008 declined the most in 2009 1/ 
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Source: African Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations. 1/ Correlation coefficient -0.489 at 1 percent 
significance level.  
 
Figure A.I.5.b. Least growing countries in 2009 rebounded the most in 2010 1/ 
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significance level. 
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Figure A.6.a.  Policy rates and growth of credit to the private sector in Tanzania, 2003 – 10 (%)  
 
Figure A.6.b.  Policy rates and growth of credit to the private sector in Uganda, 2003 – 10 (%)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database and Central Banks’ websites. 
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ANNEX II – Impact of FDI on productivity in selected countries: an empirical investigation 
In this Annex we empirically investigate the FDI-productivity nexus in selected West 
African countries, using the growth accounting framework. In this framework, FDI affects 
growth and productivity through its effect on total factor productivity (TFP), which would result 
from technology transfer and knowledge diffusion, the increased efficiency in management, 
competition, and better production techniques. It also looks at the impact of capital on output 
(MPK). In the growth accounting approach, output is produced according to:  
αα −= 1KALY            (1) 
where Y  is output, A  is TFP, L  is labor, K  is capital, and α  )1( α−  is the share of labor 
(capital) in output. The marginal product of capital becomes:  
ααα −−= KALMPK p )1( ,          (2) 
that is assuming identical technologies (α  and A ), cross-country differences in marginal 
productivity of capital stem from differences in the level of capital. Countries with same levels of 
capital would differ in their rates of return on capital depending on the level of TFP, A .  
 
Denoting FDI stock as F , the aggregate production function becomes: 
αα −= 1)( KLFAY           (3) 
with )(FA reflecting the possibility that FDI influences TFP. Marginal product of FDI under this 
production function becomes: 
pFF MPKKLAKLFAKLA +=−+ −−− αααααα α 11 )()1( ,     (4)  
where FA is the effect of FDI on TFP. Where such spillover effect is positive, the ‘social’ return 
on FDI is higher than the private marginal product of capital, ααα −− KAL)1( .  The total 
differentiation of logarithm of (3) yields the following modified growth accounting equation:  
 
K
dK
L
dL
A
dFA
Y
dY F )1( αα −++=         (5) 
Since from (1), 
Y
KMPK p=− )1( α  and IdK = , the last term becomes Y
Iβ , where pMPK=β . 
Similarly, the first term of (5) can be rewritten as 
Y
dF
A
YAF  where dF is FDI flow and A
YAF=λ  
is the first term of (4). Denoting λ to be the marginal product of TFP due to FDI 
spillovers, αα −1KLAF ,  equation (5) then takes the following form: 
 
Y
I
L
dL
Y
dF
Y
dY βαλ ++=           (6) 
 
Annual time-series data for emerging and frontier markets in West Africa (Cape Verde, 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal) in 1987 – 2008 are used and results compared with those for 
Egypt. The data for FDI, GDP (in 2000 constant prices), and investment (in 2000 constant 
prices) in these countries were obtained from the African Development database. The 
employment data are taken from the ILO database. The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is 
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used to estimate the relationship between FDI and economic growth (Table AII.1). Estimations 
were carried out with Minitab (version 15) and Stata (version 10). 
 
Table AII.1 presents several insights about the impact of FDI on growth and channels of 
transmission in these countries.32 Specifically, regarding the impact of FDI on growth through 
positive spillovers (TFP), Table AII.1  shows that among the four West African countries studied 
(Cape Verde, Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria), λ  is positive and statistically significant only for 
Cape Verde and Egypt. It implies that a 1% increase in FDI investment increases the Cape 
Verde’s growth rate by about 0.31 % and Egypt’s growth by 0.4%, through increasing TFP. In 
Senegal and Ghana, the positive impact on FDI occurs through the increased the marginal 
product of capital. In Nigeria, FDI does not have any significant impact at the aggregate level. 
  
 
Table AII.1. Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real GDP) 
 I/GDP FDI/GDP ∆L/L Adjusted R² 
Cape Verde 0.0231 (0.17) 0.3048* (1.99) -2.553 (-0.99) 0.052 
Ghana 0.0869* (2.29) -0.1292  (-0.77) -0.0230 (-0.12)       0.157 
Nigeria 0.4671 (1.48) -0.2458 (-0.48) 21.44 (1.41) 0.058 
Senegal 1/ 0.1659** (1.91) 0.7736 (1.67) -5.987 (-1.45) 0.318 
Sierra Leone 0.0263 (0.04) 0.1599 (0.33) 4.697 *(3.06) 0.295 
Egypt  0.01162  (0.16) 0.4003* (2.71) 0.1862 (0.67) 0.212 
Source: Authors’ calculations. * Denotes significance at 5%; ** significance at 10%. 1/ Data are for 1988 – 2008.  
 
 
As the next step, the aggregate incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) and the social 
marginal product of capital are derived (Table AII.2).33 Comparing the private marginal product 
of capital (MPK) and the social marginal product of capital (SMPK) reveals that in all countries 
except Nigeria the social return on capital is above the private one, albeit slightly. Investment in 
Nigeria is thus more rewarding to the private investors than to the society at large. This can be in 
part explained by the fact that most investment in Nigeria goes to the oil sector, and hence 
positive externalities are more challenging to generate. This sector’s influence on economic 
performance is constrained weak institutions and lack of capacity to maximize resource rents.  
 
 
                                                            
32 The growth accounting equation has a particularly limited explanatory power for variations of growth rates in 
Nigeria and Cape Verde. In Nigeria, the economic performance is large driven by fluctuations in oil prices, while 
Cape Verde is heavily dependent on remittances which accounted for about 20 percent of GDP in 2000s.  
 
33 The social marginal product of capital captures the impact of all factors on the productivity of capital. In contrast, 
private marginal return to capital reflects only the impact of FDI. 
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Table AII.2. ICOR and Marginal Product of Capital (MPK), average for 1987 - 2008 
 Cape Verde Ghana Nigeria Senegal 
 
Egypt 
ICOR 7.34 4.98 2.64 4.72 8.2 
SMPK  (soc.) 0.14 0.20 0.38 0.21 0.12 
MPK (priv.) 0.02 0.09 0.47 0.19 0.01 
Difference 0.11 0.11 -0.09 0.03 0.11 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Development Bank database. 
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ANNEX III -- FISCAL POLICY CYCLES IN AFRICA DURING 1980 – 2007 
 
Methodology 
 In this Annex, the cyclical properties of fiscal policy are evaluated through the co-
movement of the cyclical component of the real output (obtained through HP and/or band pass 
filters) and (i) real government consumption; (ii) real government revenues; (iii) real private 
consumption (as indication of tax base); (iii) inflation tax rates (as indication of tax rates).  
 Conceptually, the cyclical stance of fiscal policy is measured by policy instruments, 
rather than outcomes, as in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004). One of the key instruments is 
government consumption (which excludes transfers and debt service outlays) on the expenditure 
side, and tax rates on the revenue side.34 However, since reliable information on tax rates in 
developing countries, including in Africa, is sparse, this note relies on inflation tax rate instead 
for measuring tax rates and on real private consumption for measuring the tax base. 
 The sample period is from 1980 to 2007. The main sources used are the annual data 
from the African Development Bank and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook databases.  
Results 
 First the cyclical co-movement of the aggregate series for the entire Africa’s real GDP 
and real government consumption during 1980 – 2007 is examined (Table AIII.1). To ensure that 
the results are not affected by the increased capital inflows that Africa has experienced since 
mid-1990s, the sample is split into two sub-periods: (1980-1994 and 1995 – 2007). Expenditure 
polices were indeed pro-cyclical in both periods. However, differences emerge between sub-
groups, with SSA and oil importers having more pro-cyclical patterns of spending than the other 
groups (Table AIII.2).  
Table AIII.1. Africa: Correlation between real government consumption and real GDP 1/ 
 HP filter 
Aggregate, 1980 - 2007 0.443* 
Aggregate, 1980 - 1994 0.366 
Aggregate, 1995 - 2007 0.524* 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AfDB database.  1/ Correlation between the cyclical component of real 
GDP and real government spending; through HP filter. * Denotes significance at 10%. 
To find out whether the actual revenue (tax) policies were procyclical, the revenues (TR) 
need to be decomposed into tax rates τ and the tax base (TB): TBTR .τ= . In that context, Table 
AIII.3 shows that the tax base, approximated by real private consumption, was also highly pro-
cyclical during 1980 – 2007. 
 
                                                            
34 Even though widely used, the fiscal deficit may not provide a clear indication of the cyclical stance of fiscal 
policy, because of the endogeneity of tax revenues. Structural balance, in turn, may contain temporary revenue 
increases due to asset price booms, privatization, official aid, etc.  
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Table AIII.2. Correlation between real government consumption and GDP by sub-groups 1/  
  1980 - 2007 1980-1994 1995 - 2007 
By regions    
  North Africa 0.116 -0.104 0.310 
  Sub-Saharan Africa 0.437* 0.380 0.496* 
    
By resource endowments     
  Net oil exporters 0.264 0.138 0.379 
  Net oil importers 0.581* 0.316 0.809* 
Source: African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations.  1/ Correlation between the cyclical 
component of real GDP and real government spending obtained through HP filter. * indicates significance at 10% . 
Table AIII.3. Africa: Correlation between real government revenues, private consumption and 
GDP 1/ 
  1980-2007 1980-1994 1995-2007 
Real government revenues 0.700* 0.821* 0.623* 
Private consumption 0.723* 0.864* 0.651* 
Inflation tax rate 2/  -0.208 -0.321  -0.086  
Source: African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations.  1/ * indicates significance at 10%. 2/ 
Correlation between cyclical components. For inflation tax rates, a negative number indicates pro-cyclicality.   
 Moreover, cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy was asymmetric, as Africa’s fiscal stance 
was more pro-cyclical in good than in bad times (Table AIII.4). Applying the political economy 
interpretation of Talvi and Vegh (2005), this suggests that political pressures to spend during 
good times are stronger than constraining factors in bad times. Exceptions to the observation of 
generally more procyclical policies in good than bad times are WAEMU and oil exporters. 
Table AIII.4. Correlations of government consumption cycles in good and bad times  
  Good times Bad times 
Africa 0.342 0.174 
   
By regions   
  North Africa -0.148 0.517* 
  Sub-Saharan Africa 0.706* -0.076 
   
By regional agreements   
  EAC 0.425 -0.429* 
  SADC 0.758* -0.329 
  WAEMU -0.014 0.112 
  WAMZ 0.253 -0.403 
   
By resource endowments    
  Net oil exporters -0.189 0.309 
  Net oil importers 0.784* 0.002 
Source: African Economic Outlook database and authors’ calculations.  1/ Correlation between the cyclical 
component of real GDP and real government spending obtained through HP filter. * indicates significance at 10% . 
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